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Abstract
I argue that uniquely human forms of ‘Theory of Mind’ (or ‘ToM’) are a product of
cultural evolution. Specifically, propositional attitude psychology is a linguistically
constructed folk model of the human mind, invented by our ancestors for a range of
tasks and refined over successive generations of users. The construction of these folk
models gave humans new tools for thinking and reasoning about mental states—and
so imbued us with abilities not shared by non-linguistic species. I also argue that
uniquely human forms of ToM are not required for language development, such that
an account of the cultural origins of ToM does not jeopardise the explanation of
language development. Finally, I sketch a historical model of the cultural evolution of
mental state talk.
Keywords Cultural evolution · Theory of mind · Propositional attitudes · Language
development
1 Introduction
Mindreading (involving theuseof a ‘theoryofmind’, or ‘ToM’) is the ability to attribute
intentions, beliefs, and desires (and related mental states). This practice of ‘folk psy-
chology’ characteristically takes the form of attributing propositional attitudes. These
are combinations of representations (e.g., it is raining) and metarepresentational atti-
tudes towards those representations (e.g.,Felix believes that it is raining). Propositional
attitudes can include beliefs and desires which, when combined, generate intentions,
which lead to action. The ability to craft folk psychological explanations is a central
component of a human ToM and is valuable for a number of reasons—including the
explanation of behaviour. For example, if Felix wants to go out but believes that it
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is raining and prefers to stay dry, he may decide to take an umbrella. Someone who
can attribute these mental states can explain why Felix took an umbrella when he left
home.
While adult humans are better at mindreading than other species, the origins of
uniquely humanToMare disputed.Nativist accounts (e.g. Sperber 2000; Scott-Phillips
2014) argue that humans are born with better ToM than other species—and that this
is why only humans acquire language. In contrast, constructivists argue that ToM is
something that children learn (e.g. Garfield et al. 2001; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010;
Jary 2010)—such that there are fundamental differences in themindreading abilities of
children and adults. Heyes and Frith (2014) further emphasise that ToM is a product
of cultural evolution—a set of tools for thinking about minds that was invented by
our ancestors and developed by subsequent generations. On this development of the
constructivist view, different cultures might attribute mental states in different ways.
Our early human ancestors likely did not attribute propositional attitudes at all.
Developing previous constructivist accounts, here I propose an account of the cul-
tural origins of human ToM. I argue that the cultural evolution of natural language
has enabled us to model propositional attitudes for the first time, and so to employ
new tools for thinking about minds. Building on more basic abilities for tracking
agents’ perceptual and goal-directed behavioural states—abilities that we share with
other species—folk psychological models have given humans unique ToM abilities. I
suggest three forms of ToM that have been enabled thus: (1) the comparison of propo-
sitional attitudes, (2) the stacking of propositional attitudes (higher order ToM), and
(3) level-2 perspective taking—the ability to reason about how things look to others.
I also argue that an account of language acquisition is not threatened by the devel-
opmental dependence of human ToM upon language; and I sketch an account of the
possible historical emergence of ToM language.
In the next section I argue that uniquely human ToM is developmentally dependent
upon language. This is to motivate the claim that uniquely human forms of ToM are
products of linguistic and cultural evolution; and to motivate the development of a
conceptual story about the cultural origins of human mindreading. Readers familiar
with evidence that human ToM is learned and language dependent may now prefer to
skip ahead to Sect. 2.3.
2 Mindreading and language development: interpreting the data
Empirical data suggest that elements of mindreading are developmentally dependent
upon both communicative interaction and language. However, the interpretation of the
data are complicated by apparently conflicting findings. These stem from the two dif-
ferent—‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’—paradigmswith which the ontogenetic development
of ToM has been tested.
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2.1 Verbal (‘explicit’) false belief tasks
Historically, the definitive test of ToMhas been the ‘explicit’ false belief task (Wimmer
and Perner 1983), which tests subjects’ ability to attribute false beliefs. Understanding
that beliefs can be false is a prerequisite of grasping that others occupy an epistemic
perspective on the world (Dennett 1978; Bennett 1978). In the original task subjects
watched a boy, Maxi, hide his chocolate in a cupboard before leaving the room. After
Maxi left, subjectswatched hismothermove his chocolate to a different location.When
Maxi returned, subjects were asked where he would look for his chocolate. Children
younger than four reported that he would look where the chocolate was hidden; not
whereMaxi had last seen it. Thiswas interpreted as showing that children younger than
4 years do not understand that beliefs can be false—and so lack a ToM. SinceWimmer
and Perner’s study, many have sought to determine why false belief understanding is
late developing.A consistent finding has been a correlation betweenToMand language
development. The ability to pass explicit false belief tasks is predicted by semantic,
syntactic, and pragmatic competence.
With respect to semantics, young children’s performance on explicit false belief
tasks is predicted by the frequency of theirmothers’ use ofmental state verbs (Ruffman
et al. 2002; Adrian et al. 2005)—suggesting that exposure to mental state talk is key
to understanding minds. However, since mental state terms are mostly embedded in
syntactically distinctive sentences, it may be syntax and not semantics that drives
explicit ToM success (Pyers 2006).
A correlation between explicit ToM success and children’s mastery of sentential
complement syntax is now well established (de Villiers and Pyers 2002; Milligan
et al. 2007; Low 2010; Grosse-Wiesmann et al. 2017a, b). Sentential complements are
clauses embedded under propositional attitude verbs within a sentence—e.g., Felix
believes that Zoë is in the office. Such forms help to represent false beliefs because
their form emphasises the contrast between a proposition and an attitude towards that
proposition. They can therefore be used to model thoughts in which the main clause
is false (e.g., because Zoë is at home) but the whole is true (because Felix’s belief
was false). Since this is the linguistic structure that we use to express false beliefs,
de Villiers and de Villiers (2000) argued that mastery of sentential complements is
necessary for false belief understanding. This might be especially true for high order
representations like Kofi believes that Felix believes that Zoë is in the office. Children
grasp second order metarepresentations (A believes that B believes that p) only around
6 years (Perner and Wimmer 1985; Grueneisen et al. 2015).
Training studies support the idea that false belief understanding is facilitated by
sentential complement mastery. For example, Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) trained
children in different forms of discourse before testing them in an explicit false belief
task. During the training an experimenter talked to 3-year-olds about ‘deceptive’
objects (e.g., an eraser that looked like a car) using language that was varied across
conditions. Where the experimenter described the deceptive appearance of the object
using complement clauses, children performed better. However, since their perfor-
mance improved similarlywhere experimenters expressed conflicting attitudeswithout
using sentential complements, these cannot be necessary for improved performance.
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Other studies also show that sentential complements are not sufficient for an explicit
understanding of false beliefs. For example, in German ‘that’-clauses are used to dis-
cuss both belief and desire, yet German children still understand desire talk earlier
than belief talk (Perner et al. 2003).
One possibility is that it is not complement sentence mastery per se that drives the
false belief understanding required for explicit ToM tasks, but an understanding of the
ways inwhich individuals can have different attitudes towards the same states of affairs
(including epistemic attitudes that can be correct or incorrect). Since speakers can
communicate divergent (and false) perspectives without using mental state vocabulary
or sentential complements, it may be exposure to dialogue that is critical for children’s
ToM development (Harris et al. 2005), rather than complement mastery alone.1 This
is consistent with the possibility that specific forms of syntax facilitate false belief
understanding, even if they are not necessary for it.
Evidence of the ToM abilities of users of Nicaraguan Sign Language
(NSL)—invented by children at a school in Nicaragua after it opened in 1977—sug-
gests that language contributes something that conversation alone does not. Deaf
children born to hearing parents pass explicit false belief paradigms significantly later
than hearing children born to hearing parents (and also Deaf children born to Deaf
parents) because they are deprived of communicative input early in life (Peterson and
Siegal 2000). Since children at the NSL school were mostly born to hearing parents,
their ToMwas typically underdeveloped upon arrival. To study the effects of language
acquisition on ToM reasoning, Pyers and Senghas (2009) tested two generations of
adults who had attended the school. Those who joined the school later and learned a
more sophisticated version of NSL performed better in explicit false belief tasks than
those who had learned a more rudimentary version of NSL (Pyers and Senghas 2009).
Since both cohorts were experienced communicators, the improved ToM of the later
cohort seems best explained by appeal to differences in the language they had learned.
A final source of data for the development of ToM comes from cross-cultural
studies. Children from some parts of the world pass explicit false belief tests later than
in others. For example, in Samoaminds are considered to be opaque, and talking about
others’ mental states is taboo (Ochs 1988). Samoan children are therefore less exposed
to mental state talk than elsewhere. Perhaps as a result, most do not pass explicit false
belief tasks until they are 8 years old, with a third of 10–12-year-olds still performing
poorly (Mayer and Träuble 2013).
These findings support the hypothesis that explicit mindreading is developmentally
correlated with both themastery of sentential complements and experience of commu-
nicating with others. Some have therefore argued that complement clause syntax and
conversational experience are individually necessary and together sufficient for the
development of uniquely human ToM (Garfield et al. 2001). I will (roughly) endorse
1 de Villiers (2005) defended the syntax-only explanation of ToM development by refining her account
of the sentential complements needed for ToM. To explain why German children’s use of ‘that’-clauses
did not suffice for ToM, she differentiated between realis and irrealis complements, with the former (used
for describing observable reality) deemed necessary for false belief understanding, and the latter (used for
describing possibilities) used in desire talk. As Van Cleave andGauker (2010) observe, this distinctionmaps
neither to clear differences between belief and desire talk, nor to salient syntactic features that could be
learned by children—making the syntax-only hypothesis less plausible than one that takes conversational
experience of clashing perspectives to be necessary for mastery of sentential complements.
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this view. Following others (e.g., Garfield et al. 2001; Rakoczy 2017; O’Madagain and
Tomasello 2019), I argue that complement clause syntax gives humans new representa-
tional tools with which to model propositional attitudes. Communicative interaction is
both the background against which linguistic tools for talking about minds are learned
and the historical foundation for their invention. While conversation gives children
experience of how perspectives on the world can differ, the acquisition of language
gives them a way in which to represent and reason about these differences—for exam-
ple, by facilitating their representation of contrasting attitudes to the same proposition.
Nonetheless, claims about the necessity of language for ToM must be qualified.
Evidence shows that some stroke victims have retained their false belief reasoning
abilities despite losing the ability to process the grammatical structures that enable false
belief reasoning (Apperly et al. 2006). In that case, if the role of language is necessary,
it must be in a developmental sense. Language is needed for acquiring representational
abilities that can persist even after an agent’s ability to use the relevant linguistic forms
is lost. Further, I do not claim that language is the only way to acquire a human-like
ToM. It may be that ToM-like representations could be acquired non-linguistically
(Berio 2020). In that case even a developmental necessity claim is not a metaphysical
claim about human possibility, so much as a claim about our normal developmental
trajectory. Uniquely human ToM is learned and language and communication are the
standard routes through which we learn it.
Before developing a positive account of ToM development, I say something about
nativist alternatives. Since the development of non-verbal false belief paradigms, new
nativist accounts of mindreading have complicated the interpretation of the ToM data.
2.2 Non-verbal (‘implicit’) false belief tasks
Following the findings of Wimmer and Perner (1983), many accepted that young
children cannot understand mental states. This presented a number of problems for
developmental accounts of human cognition. Not least, accounts of language develop-
ment have often held that language acquisition requires developed ToM (see Breheny
2006; Moore 2017a, 2018b). This led to what Astington (2006, p. 196) described
as a “paradox at the heart” of cognitive development research: language acquisition
requires a developed ToM—which is seemingly language dependent. If this paradox
is real, language development may be explicable only by assuming that, current data
aside, human ToM is innate or early developing (Sperber 2000; Scott-Phillips 2014).
In 2005 two studies showedawayout of the paradoxby suggesting that infantsmight
posses a ToM after all. In contrast to the ‘explicit’ verbal measures used in the earlier
paradigms, these studies used ‘implicit’ non-verbal looking time measures (Onishi
and Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007). Whereas explicit tasks track children’s
ability to report on how agents with false beliefs will act, the latter use children’s gaze
behaviour to determine whether they anticipate that agents with false beliefs will act
as if they had true beliefs. When shown scenarios like the original paradigm, children
of 15-months looked longer when the Maxi character looked for his object in the
correct location—suggesting surprise. This was interpreted as showing that infants
can track others’ false beliefs, and make predictions about their behaviour on this
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basis—supporting the conclusion that older children’s failure in explicit tasks was
unrelated to ToM development.
Since 2005, a large literature has tried to make sense of these apparently conflicting
data. If infants can pass implicit false belief tasks by the end of their first year, thenwhy
do they fail explicit tasks before they are four? Some argue that belief understanding
is innate, but that younger children are unable to recruit that understanding in explicit
mindreading tasks (Carruthers 2013). Thismay be because 3-year-olds lack familiarity
with certain types of mental state discourse and are confused by the experimenter’s
questions (Helming et al. 2014, 2016;Westra 2017). This argument gains support from
an explicit ToM task that simplified the pragmatics of the questions posed, and which
children passed at three (Rubio-Fernández and Geurts 2012, 2016).
While some still hold that pre-verbal infants understand false belief, evidence for
this claim looks increasingly underwhelming. In recent years, the failure to replicate
a number of implicit tasks has mired this area of research in controversy. Rakoczy
and Behne have described the current findings regarding implicit studies as “complex,
confusing and puzzling” (Rakoczy and Behne 2019, p. 94), and concluded that infants’
ToM abilities are unknown. Others conclude that at least strong interpretations of
infant ToM abilities (attributing to them an understanding of propositional attitudes)
are unsupported by current data (Poulin-Dubois et al. 2018).
Despite this confusion, several studies now suggest that an early developing or
innate capacity for tracking (but not fully representing) belief-like states is enhanced
through language development. Studies of ToM development in 3–4-year-old children
show that the abilities recruited in implicit ToM are not the same as those recruited
in explicit ToM tasks. For example, Low (2010) showed that while performance in
explicitmindreading tasks is correlatedwith the development of sentential complement
syntax, success in implicit tasks is not. Additionally GrosseWiesmann and colleagues
(2020) have replicated their own finding that in 3- and 4-year-olds different areas of the
brain are recruited in implicit and explicit ToM tasks (Grosse Wiesmann et al. 2017a,
b). Explicit ToM reasoning takes place in the precuneus and temporoparietal junction,
which is implicated in adult ToM. Implicit ToM reasoning, however, is supported by
an independent neural network including the supramarginal gyrus, which is implicated
in visual perspective-taking and action observation. Explicit ToM is also supported by
white matter maturation in brain regions associated with adult ToM—and which are
under-developed in toddlers (Grosse Wiesmann et al. 2017a, b, 2020).
The possibility that an early-developing or innate belief tracking ability is enriched
by language gains further support from recent studies showing that chimpanzees,
bonobos and orang-utans all succeed in an implicit ToM task (Krupenye et al. 2016).
This finding suggests that the cognitive mechanisms needed for implicit ToM tasks
may be common to all great ape species (and so present in our last common ancestor
too). While the finding has yet to be replicated, it gains support from evidence that
chimpanzees can track the knowledge states of their peers. They both avoid food that
dominant individuals have seen (Hare et al. 2001) and call to warn naïve peers of the
presence of sleeping snakes (Crockford et al. 2012, 2017; Moore 2019).
123
Synthese
2.3 ‘Lean’ interpretations of implicit ToM tasks
If these data support a developmental account of ToM, the precise nature of non-verbal
mindreading is still not understood. Many have argued that data from implicit false
belief tasks (and other non-verbal perspective-taking tasks—e.g. Hare et al. 2001;
Crockford et al. 2012) can be explained without a propositional attitude psychology
(e.g., Apperly and Butterfill 2009; Apperly 2010; Rakoczy 2017; Heyes 2018). Two
of these approaches have sought to provide an account of the cognitive foundations
of ToM by specifying the mechanisms that support implicit ToM. Heyes (2018) has
argued that implicit mindreading can be explained by appeal to domain- (and species-)
general cognitive resources, including memory, attention, and associative learning. In
contrast, Apperly and Butterfill (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; Apperly 2010; Butterfill
and Apperly 2013; Low et al. 2016) have argued for a ‘two-systems’ view, where
implicit ToM is explained by an evolved cognitive module for ‘minimal mindreading’
that enables agents to track relationships between objects and other agents’ lines of
sight. When supplemented with additional evolved heuristics—e.g., the knowledge
that agents act only in light of what they have seen—these ‘registrations’ permit the
tracking of belief-like states (albeit ones that lack propositional contents). Tracking
belief-like states enablesminimalmindreaders tomake fairly reliable predictions about
how agents with true and false beliefs will act.
An account of human ToM should ultimately have something to say about the
cognition that supports implicit ToM. Here, though, I remain open-minded. It is parsi-
monious to assume that infants and great apes the share the cognitive mechanisms that
support the tracking of belief-like states (Sober 2005; Moore 2017d). Since my own
research is primarily concerned with explaining the differences between these species,
and with providing an account of what enabled ToM development in the former but not
the latter, this makes it legitimate to bracket questions about the common mechanisms
that support implicit ToM.
While the Heyes and two-systems accounts both endorse a language-dependence
view of human ToM, they say little about how creatures lacking a developed ToM
might invent and acquire one. Since my goal is to fill in that gap, my interest in pre-
verbal ToM is motivated by considerations of what is needed for language to develop.
My concern is to sketch a theoretical account of how ToM could be invented and
learned; and so to free us from the assumption that uniquely human ToM must be
innate because it is needed for language development (Sperber 2000; Scott-Phillips
2014).
3 The cultural evolution of mind-modelling
If human ToM is learned, how should we think about its historical development, and
the relationship between ToM and other cognitive abilities? Here I spell out three
commitments of the view I defend.
First, if human ToM is developmentally dependent on the mastery of certain natu-
ral language forms (like sentential complements), then in key respects it is a human
invention. Even if the foundations of language use are innate (e.g. Berwick and Chom-
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sky 2016), natural languages like English and German were created, and the earliest
languages likely contained little syntactic complexity. More complex forms of syntax
emerged only as young languages were developed and refined over successive gener-
ations of use and under cultural selection for greater expressive power (see Sect. 5 for
discussion). As better tools were invented, language users preferentially adopted them,
while discarding older, less powerful types of linguistic construction (Christiansen and
Chater 2016). This makes it highly likely that the earliest languages lacked the syn-
tactic complexity needed for ToM talk, and that human ToM is therefore a product of
cultural evolution.
Second, and building on other constructivist accounts (de Villiers and de Villiers
2000; Garfield et al. 2001; Maibom 2003; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010; O’Madagain
and Tomasello 2019), we can think of the explanatory framework of propositional
attitude psychology as a language-based folk model of the mind. It was likely invented
by our ancestors for a range of tasks connected to human sociality, including but not
limited to predicting and explanaing behaviour. Conceived in this way, models are
theory-like knowledge structures designed by their users for describing hypothesised
states (Godfrey-Smith 2005; see also Maibom 2003). Models differ from theories
by being theoretically less developed. For example, the simplest folk models might
contain inconsistent propositions; or clusters of wisdom that have yet to be rationally
integrated. Because models can describe the states they model more or less accurately,
they can increase in complexity over time. Those that start off as a loose patchwork
of informally sketched ideas may become more systematic as they are refined over
generations. Models are therefore useful theoretical tools for characterising processes
of knowledge formation that started off in some of the earliest human communities.
Third, building on work on the cultural invention of cognitive tools by Dennett
(1995) and Heyes (Heyes and Frith 2014; Heyes 2018), I suggest that our folk psycho-
logical models have provided humans with a new format for representing intentions,
beliefs and desires. This representational format does not replace the more basic
interactions that ground our earliest social interactions and enable our language devel-
opment. However, it has given us new abilities for talking and thinking about mental
states, allowing us to theorise aboutminds in newways.HumanToMhas thus extended
beyond that of other species. Just as the expressive power of our natural languages
have increased over time, so our cognitive powers also extended, as new linguistic
forms facilitated the development of expressively more powerful folk psychological
models.
3.1 Folk psychology as amodel
The idea that folk psychology can be conceived as a model of the mind stems from
Dennett (1987, p. 43ff.; see also Gopnik et al. 1997; Maibom 2003; Godfrey-Smith
2005; Jara-Ettinger 2019). As Dennett argued, folk psychology (in his term, ‘inten-
tional systems analysis’) is a powerful tool for rationalising behaviour. Idealising
somewhat, if an agent’s beliefs and desires are treated as those that it ought to have
given its situation (e.g., those that would ensure its survival), then its actions can be
predicted before they happen and underlying rationales explained.
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Dennett treats propositional attitude psychology as an interpretative framework
that underwent cultural selection for the prediction and explanation of behaviour.
This framework gives its users a powerful tool for social interaction while allowing
them to remain agnostic about which sorts of states support propositional attitude
ascriptions. Terms like ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ may be applied to a cognitive system
without assuming that it has conscious, first-personal states. By treating the agent as
if it is an intentional system, its behaviour can nonetheless be explained. Scientific
models help their users to understand the hypothesised states they are modelling by
in some sense resembling them (Godfrey-Smith 2005). However it is a virtue of the
Dennettian approach (and other similar ones, e.g.Maibom 2003) that this resemblance
can take a number of forms. This is consistent with the possibility that the users of
folk psychological models might conceive of minds in a number of ways. Early human
may not have had deep insights into the nature of mental life prior to developing folk
psychological models, or they might have conceived of these states in very different
ways from us. (Even now philosophers are divided about how the states described by
folk psychology should be construed. While some hold that propositional attitudes are
literal descriptions of content bearing states (e.g. Fodor 2008), others hold that “talk
of mental states is a useful pretence for describing people and their behaviour” (Toon
2016).2)
On an approach that treats folk psychology as the cultural development of models,
we should think of its development as a gradual process in which communities of
language-users modified their languages to create and refine their tools for talking
about one another. Such developments would have taken place during everyday inter-
actions like hunting trips or campfire meetings. Prediction and explanation need not
have been the only motives for developing folk models. Thus early models might have
been enriched through the development of language for coordinating behaviour (Van
Cleave and Gauker 2010; Tomasello 2014), holding others accountable for breaking
commitments (Jary 2010; Geurts 2019a), and through cultural practices of storytelling
and the sharing of oral histories (Hutto 2007). We need not suppose that any single
societal function was the primary driver of invention and innovation. Once linguistic
tools were invented, they would be put to use for whatever range of tasks benefitted
their users. Folk models innovated in one domain might be refined across a range of
tasks, with these tasks also varying across communities.3
If folk psychology is the cultural construction of theory-like models of behaviour,
we can also see why ToM might deliver only crude generalisations of how agents
behave (Maibom2003), andwhy folkmodelsmight incorporate the cultural prejudices
of their users (Eickers 2019). Explanatory models might reflect culturally grounded
assumptions about how individuals do and should behave. As a result, some elements
of models would not be common to all communities.While relatively little is currently
known about cultural differences in mindreading, evidence suggests substantial vari-
2 My view is realist. Humans possess first personal states that correspond broadly to elements in our folk
psychology. Nonetheless, some of the distinctions we make in language may be motivated by explanatory
concerns rather than salient experiential differences. Additionally, following Hurley (1998), I do not assume
that first personal states will correspond neatly to sub-personal states.
3 Within domains of use ToM may still follow predictable developmental trajectories. See Van Cleave and
Gauker (2010) for detailed (albeit speculative) discussion.
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ation. Lillard (1998; via Wierzbicka 1992) observes that while all known languages
have words that correspond roughly to ‘want’, ‘think’, ‘know’, and ‘feel’, these words
may not represent the same concepts. Moreover, while the Cartesian conception of
the self as a seat of thoughts, feelings, and desires that cause behaviour is central to
western thinking, not all culture attach the same significance to attributions of mental
states. Hindu Indians tend to emphasise situations rather than character traits as causes
of behaviour (Miller 1984), and the Ifaluk Pacific Islanders emphasise the role of peers
as causes (Lutz 1985). Philosophical conceptions of ToM should accommodate this
variety. Culturally grounded folk models can reflect these differences.
This description doesn’t yet show how folk psychological modelling projects could
extend human cognition. But once we think of propositional attitude psychology
as a construction project whose value lies in its social utility we can envisage how
the demand for better models might have led to the refinement and development of
more rudimentary ones. There are numerous contexts in which more precise tools for
describing behaviour (and the mental states underlying behaviour) would be valuable,
leading to pressure for a greater range of linguistic tools, and permitting—for exam-
ple—the expression of more fine-grained distinctions between epistemic and conative
states. In turn these would support inferences that would not previously have been
possible.
The idea that culturally evolved cognitive tools extend human cognition is not new.
It is well established that the natural number system has changed the cognition of
which we are capable. An illustration of how this happens will give us a point of
comparison for thinking about the cultural evolution of mental state talk and the new
forms of cognition that it enables.4
3.2 The cultural evolution of number cognition
We now know that the cultural evolution of counting systems has changed human
number cognition. Recent empirical research suggests that humans are born with two
cognitive systems relevant to enumeration (Everett 2017; also Xu 2003). One system,
present in infants (Feigenson and Carey 2003), is used to make precise judgements
about small numbers of objects (three in infancy, increasing to four in adulthood).
A second system is used for tracking approximate quantities larger than four and is
also present in 6-month old infants (Xu 2003). This Approximate Number System
enables our judgements about relative quantities. Together these systems enable us to
make precise judgements about small quantities of objects and approximate judge-
ments about larger quantities. Since similar abilities seem to be present in primates
(Brannon and Terrace 1998; Hauser and Carey 2003), the mechanisms that support
such judgements are likely to be phylogenetically old.
Evidence that precise calculations about the relationships between large numbers
became possible only with the invention of natural number systems comes from anu-
meric communities. The Pirahã people of the Amazon, whose language contains no
4 Apperly and Butterfill (2009) also note an analogy between ToM and number cognition. While they
present evidence that number cognition relies on two distinct cognitive systems, my concern is to show how
developed number cognition is a product of cultural evolution.
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precise number terms, have been shown to struggle to make precise numerical judge-
ments for quantities greater than three (Frank et al. 2008). While the ability to perform
complex calculations is now shared by most cultures, the development of number
representations emerged only relatively slowly in human history. The oldest known
written number system, found in Sumeria, is only around 5300 years ago (ibid.). In
all known counting systems, representational tools for higher numerosities emerged
through the extension of the object individuation system, via the innovation of number
words that mapped to exact values in a tally system. In many languages number words
are related to the words for hands and feet (e.g., the word for ‘five’ may be derived
from the word for ‘hand’), suggesting that these were the tallies onto which number
words were first mapped. This is why many counting systems are base 5 (single hand),
10 (both hands), or 20 (hands and feet) (Everett 2017).
The invention of numbers for larger integers allowed for the precise enumeration of
larger quantities. However they were still of only limited use for complex calculations.
These became tractable only with the historical invention of ways of representing the
value zero—first seen in the Sumerian culture around 5kya, but independently rein-
vented by both Mayan and Indian mathematicians (Kaplan 1999). The invention of a
tool for representing zero dramatically facilitated the performance of long multiplica-
tion and division.
As adults who have mastered natural number systems, it is easy to forget that
our ancestors could not calculate like we do. While many humans can now mentally
compute that 907/3  302.3 recurring, the first of our ancestors to do this lived tens of
thousands of years after the great exodus of early humans from Africa 60 kya. Prior to
the development of natural number systemswithwhich to systematise and precisify our
calculations, ordinary individuals could not makes precise comparisons of quantity,
or multiply one large number by another. In that respect, our current mathematical
abilities are a product of cultural tools developed and refined by our ancestors.
4 Natural language and folk psychology
Just as the development of a natural number systemenabled agents to drawfine-grained
contrasts betweennumerosities, the development of folk psychologicalmodels enabled
new forms of mental state cognition. Perhaps three abilities were enabled thus: (1) the
comparison of propositional attitudes; (2) the stacking of propositional attitudes; and
(3) ‘level 2’ perspective taking—that ability to track not just what others perceive
but how they represent it. These abilities became possible because developments in
natural languages helped our ancestors to track relationships that would otherwise
have exceeded their representational capacities.5
5 Language dependent models could be natural language descriptions of elements of an interaction, or
scenarios that are modelled visually and then interpreted using propositional attitude sentences. I remain




With respect to point (1) consider how the formulation of different propositional
attitude verbs can help us to clarify our different attitudes towards the sameproposition:
Richard believes that the train will leave on time.
Marie doubts that the train will leave on time.
If we knew that Richard andMarie were aiming to catch the same train, these contrast-
ing attitudes would help us to understand why Richard rushed to leave while Marie
stopped to get lunch.
Cases like this one show how language can extend thought. In a compelling recent
account of how children acquire adult-like false belief understanding, O’Madagain
and Tomasello (2019) argue that children learn that others’ attitudes towards the truth
and falsity of the same proposition can differ because with adults they can engage
in joint attention towards the propositions that speakers assert. The existence of con-
flicting epistemic attitudes comes into view through the comparison of individuals’
inconsistent responses. Suppose that Richard andMarie are together told that the train
will leave at 1 pm. While Richard picks up his bag and makes to leave, Marie laughs
and puts the kettle on. Their non-verbal responses towards the same proposition can be
used both as a starting point for learning about disagreement (credulity versus doubt,
e.g.), and for learning the language (e.g. propositional attitude verbs) that helps us to
keep track of disagreements.
When children start to pass traditional false belief tasks, theymay be using language
to represent both that The chocolate is not in the cupboard and, simultaneously, that
Maxi believes that the chocolate is in the cupboard. Here language helps us to track
the conflict between how the world is and epistemic attitudes towards it, and so to
predict that Maxi will look in the wrong location. Simply being able formulate and
entertain contrasting epistemic attitudes—by placing them in a common linguistic
format—facilitates the construction of better explanatory and predictive models.
There is evidence that when adults are prevented from thinking linguistically in
explicit false belief tasks, their performance falters. However, the evidence is imper-
fect. Newton and de Villiers (2007) tested adults in a simple non-verbal false belief
task. They found that when participants had to repeat heard sentences while watching a
video in which an agent acquired and subsequently acted upon a false belief, more than
half failed (18/31 unsuccessful). In a second condition in which participants had to tap
out a heard rhythm instead, almost all subjects passed (29/35 successful). This finding
suggests that even in a non-verbal false belief task, interrupting participants’ language
abilities undermines their performance. This would be predicted if they were using
language to keep track of what they were watching. Nonetheless, this interpretation
of the data has been complicated by a recent study. Dungan and Saxe (2012) found
that, at high tempos, adult performance in matched paradigms was also inhibited when
participants had to tap out heard rhythms. While this subsequent finding is consistent
with the possibility that adult ToM is both language-based and apt to be interrupted
by demanding non-linguistic tasks, it also opens up the possibility that the Newton
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and de Villiers (2007) findings are better explained by the greater working memory
demands in the language condition. Further research is therefore needed.6
4.2 Stackingmental states
Linguistically constructed mental state models could also play a causal role in the
ability to represent higher orders of mental states, like this third order metarepresen-
tation:
Richard knows that Kofi doubts that Marie believes the train will leave on time.
Some argue that such complex representations are foundational to many aspects
of human life—not least communication (Grice 1989; Sperber 2000; Scott-Phillips
2014)—and so potentially something that humans have evolved to represent (e.g.
Sperber 2000; O’Grady et al. 2015).
Despite the relative ease with which adults understand high order metarepresenta-
tions (O’Grady et al. 2015), developmental data show that the ability to track them is
both difficult for children and slow developing. Liddle and Nettle (2006) found that 10
and 11-year-old children track the contents of third-order metarepresentations slightly
above chance, but that even 12-year-olds struggled to track fourth- ordermetarepresen-
tations. Additionally 6-year-olds but not 5-year-olds have been shown able to reason
about second-order beliefs (Perner and Wimmer 1985, Grueneisen et al. 2015). This
is consistent with the possibility that higher order metarepresentations are language
dependent, and develop contingently upon the ability to embed a proposition within
multiple propositional attitude phrases. Mastery of higher order metarepresentations
would then be acquired as children acquire fluency in the use of the longer sentences
needed to model them. This could be tested with new studies of the developmental
relationship between sentential complement syntax and higher order of ToM.
4.3 Level 2 perspective taking
A third sense in which language may extend human social cognition is through ‘level
2’ perspective-taking (e.g. Flavell et al. 1981).
Level 1 perspective taking involves tracking what different agents have and have
not seen. Both infants and great apes do this. For example, chimpanzees vocalise the
presence of snakes to peers who have not seen them (Crockford et al. 2012, 2017).
Similarly, 12-month-olds point out the location of an object to an experimenter who
has lost it (Liszkowski et al. 2006). If both young infants and great apes are capable
of level 1 perspective-taking, it may be innate in the hominin lineage (Apperly and
Butterfill 2009; although see Heyes 2018).
Level 2 perspective-taking is the ability to grasp how things appear to others when
perceived from different perspectives. It is later developing in children. Moll and
Meltzoff (2011) ran a study in which young children sat opposite an experimenter with
two identical blue objects placed between them. A yellow filter was placed between
6 Claims about language-based thought and working memory are not inconsistent. One possibility is that
language helps humans to think better because it organises working memory more efficiently..
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the experimenter and one object so that that object looked green to her but blue to the
subject. When the experimenter requested either “the blue one” or “the green one”
(without letting her gaze fall upon the desired object), 3-year-old children correctly
selected the object (ibid.). However, in a follow up study (Moll et al. 2013), 3-year-old
children in the same setup could not answer “How do you see it from over there? …
How do I see it from over here?” questions, where this required contrasting how things
looked different to themselves and the experimenter. Only 4.5-year-olds could do this.
Moll and colleagues explain this finding on the basis that, while 3-year-olds can track
how things look to others (‘taking perspectives’) they are unable to represent that the
same thing can simultaneously look different to individuals seeing it from different
perspectives (‘confronting perspectives’).
Despite several attempts to elicit level 2 perspective-taking in chimpanzees, no
evidence for it has been found. In one recent study a chimpanzee competed with a
conspecific over two breadsticks (Karg et al. 2016). While the subject could see that
the sticks were the same size, one appeared larger to the competitor. The competitor
was able to choose a breadstick first, but her choice was hidden from the subject. If
subjects could track that one stick looked bigger to their competitor they could get
food for themselves in every trial by choosing the stick that looked smaller to their
competitor. Otherwise they would get rewarded only at chance (50%). In contrast to
6-year-old children, chimpanzees did not perform above chance.
Level 2 perspective-taking has been hypothesized to be developmentally dependent
upon language (Apperly and Butterfill 2009). One possibility is that older children can
do it because they use language to reconstruct the visual perspectives of others. This
might take the form of a linguistically framed contrast between different perspectives
on the same object—e.g., X sees that the object is blue and Y sees that the object is
green. A possible explanation for why three-year-olds cannot confront perspectives is
that, even if they can pick up on visual and verbal cues to make judgements about how
things look to others, they cannot construct for themselves the linguistic models that
facilitate understanding inconsistent appearances. Evidence for this hypothesis could
be sought via studies of the developmental relationship between language and level
2 perspective-taking, and the possibility of impairing level 2 perspective-taking with
verbal shadowing tasks (or similar methods).
4.4 Linguistic models of other minds
While natural language plays a fundamental role in the development of human ToM
reasoning, this does not entail that mind-modelling is accompanied by an inner
monologue formulating syllogisms out of propositional attitudes. In challenging or
unfamiliar situations this may sometimes happen, but for users practised in the manip-
ulation of models, elements of ToM reasoning may become automated. In these cases
the deliberate reconstruction of propositional attitudes may become no more neces-
sary for mindreading than is calculating to know the square root of 256. Through
a process of downward modularistation (Apperly 2010), our perception may become
theory-laden. This is presumablywhy a stroke patient, PH, was found to retain first and
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second order ToM abilities even after substantial impairment of their comprehension
of the syntactic forms associated with ToM success (Apperly et al. 2006).
For related reasons, this account should also avoid objections that it intellectualises
our interactions with others. It is in some respects a version of ‘Theory Theory”—the
view that we come to understand other minds by learning a theoretical body of knowl-
edge. Some argue that Theory Theory misconstrues our understanding of others by
presenting “our initial stance with respect to others” as “essentially estranged” (Hutto
2004, p. 549; see also McGeer 2007, p. 146 and Zawidzki 2013, 2019). On this
objection, a barrier of (pseudo-)scientific theorising alienates us from our peers, and
intellectualises our dealings with them. The mistake behind this complaint is the
thought that, because ToM can involve elements of theory, our social cognition is
fundamentally a reflective, intellectual process. I do not claim that. Because models
are constructed in language, our invention and recruitment of them depends on a more
basic repertoire of affective and embodied socio-cognitive skills—including but not
limited to gaze tracking, an understanding of goal directed activity, and a host of other
empathic relations and cooperative motivations (Tomasello 2014; Rubio-Fernandez
2020). These abilities constitute the socio-cognitive foundation of our language use.
Mental statemodels supplement our foundational ways of interactingwith otherswith-
out replacing them. Similarly, just as we do not understand others solely on the basis of
learned theories, we may also sometimes know other minds by simulation (Goldman
2006).
5 Inventing and acquiring a ToM
I previously mentioned a serious objection for the claim that human ToM is enabled
by language: the possibility that language is itself dependent on human ToM. This
concern has been left largely unaddressed by proponents of the language-first view,
who have had little to say about the development of the languages whose existence
they presuppose (e.g., de Villiers and de Villiers 2000; Garfield et al. 2001; Heyes and
Frith 2014). If an account of the cultural origins of human ToM is to be credible, more
needs to be said.
5.1 ToM and language development
Gricean communication is the name given to communication that involves agents who
act with and attribute communicative intentions (Grice 1957, 1989). It is thought to
require various demanding ToM abilities, including an understanding of belief and
of fourth order metarepresentations (see Moore 2017a, 2018b). Since many argue
that Gricean communication is also necessary for language development (e.g. Sperber
2000; Tomasello 2008; Scott-Phillips 2014), this is taken to be evidence that high order
metarepresentational abilitiesmust be innate (Sperber andWilson 2002; Sperber 2000;
Scott-Phillips 2014; see Breheny 2006 and Moore 2017a for discussion).7 This is a
7 Tomasello (1999, 2008, 2019) thinks children undergo a conceptual revolution in their ToM between 3
and 4 years, and that this is connected to the development of language and cooperation (Tomasello 2018,
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reason to take nativism about ToM seriously, even if empirical data underdetermine
its plausibility.
Before considering whether uniquely human ToMmust precede language develop-
ment I want to start by agreeing with the neo-Gricean view: Language development
must be grounded in pragmatic interpretation—that is, in speakerswho can actwith and
attribute communicative intentions.8 This is for a number of reasons (Moore 2018b).
First, acting with and attributing communicative intent is necessary for the invention
of natural languages because pragmatic interpretation is the foundation against which
the meanings of semantic and syntactic elements can be introduced and calibrated.
Moreover, where natural languages with only a limited vocabulary and syntax exist,
and can be used only to formulate ambiguous utterances (see Sect. 5), pragmatic
interpretation will be necessary for the interpretation of messages. Second, the best
way to explain language development in ontogeny is by accepting that it is pre-verbal
infants’ pragmatic interpretation abilities that enable them to figure out themeanings of
words and sentences. This makes the existence of pre-verbal Gricean communicative
interaction the best prospect for explaining language development (ibid.). Where my
account departs from other pragmatics-first accounts is by denying that the demands
of Gricean communication are a reason for thinking that uniquely human ToM must
be early developing or innate.
I have argued that (‘minimally’) Gricean communication is, contrary to the con-
sensus view, socio-cognitively undemanding (Moore 2016, 2017a, b, c, 2018a, b).
Acting with communicating intent requires only knowing how to produce signs (e.g.
words or gestures) in order to express one’s communicative goals, and knowing how
to address these signs to the attention of interlocutors in ways that elicit an appropri-
ate response (Moore 2017a). Attributing communicative intent requires only grasping
when one is being addressed by another, and knowing how to interpret the goals with
which utterances are produced. This requires neither complex metarepresentation, nor
a developed propositional attitude psychology, nor even concepts of mental states like
belief. It does not even require mastery of an extensive repertoire of signs (Moore
2016, 2017a, b). Consequently, the ToM abilities needed for language development
are not the same ones that develop only with language and communication; and they
are present in both young infants and great apes (Moore 2016, 2017c). An account
of language development grounded in Gricean communication is therefore consistent
with a story that takes the uniquely human ToM be developmentally dependent upon
language. The paradox of language development can be avoided.
5.2 Pragmatic interpretation and the Grammaticalisation of language
Against a background of non-linguistic agents who act with and attribute communica-
tive intentions, both the acquisition and cultural evolution of natural languages can
Footnote 7 continued
2019; O’Madagain & Tomasello, 2019). Nonetheless, he holds that infants possess a form of ToM that is
not shared by great apes, which enables humans to acquire language (Tomasello, 2008). I argue against this
view (Moore 2017d).
8 The word ‘pragmatics’ is used in a number of ways, with unhelpful consequences for explaining language
development (Bar-On and Moore 2017; Moore 2017d). I use the term only to describe acts of interpreting
communicative intent. Some (e.g. Geurts 2019a, b) would think this restriction parochial.
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be explained. With respect to cultural evolution, processes of semantic and syntactic
innovation would have been key.
When our ancestors started to develop the first natural languages, their proto-
languages would have contained an initially small number of words and little
grammatical structure. As speakers became more fluent in their sign use, they inno-
vated new words and grammatical constructions in order to better express themselves.
Innovation was possible precisely because speakers were already Gricean communi-
cators. As Grice (1989) supposed, new words and grammatical constructions would
have entered on the back of speakers’ innovative uses. Once a speaker had used a new
construction to communicate a message, and an interlocutor had successfully inter-
preted their intended message, similar messages could be communicated using the
same combinations of signs (Moore 2013). As particular uses of words became more
strongly associated with particular communicative functions, semantic and syntactic
conventions emerged.
Recent work by Progovac (2015) indicates the likely form of proto-syntactic lan-
guages. Progovac argues that the propositional structures of contemporary natural
languages were preceded by a stage of grammaticalisation that consisted of single
verb-like and noun-like elements bound together non-hierarchically.9 In these proto-
sentences, the verb like structure took only a single argument that specified neither a
subject nor an object. During this stage, the most complex available utterances con-
sisted of simple combinations like:
[1] Eat chicken.
Such phrases would be highly ambiguous. For example, [1] does not distinguish
between:
[2] The chicken is eating.
[3] I eat the chicken.
[4] You will eat the chicken.
[5] You ate the chicken.
Utterances like [1] would have provided users with a range of tools for communi-
cating and coordinating with others. Because of their ambiguity, speakers using such
constructions would have depended upon their interlocutors’ pragmatic interpreta-
tion skills for communication to succeed. Nonetheless, these constructions would
have served as a foundation against which semantic innovation and grammaticali-
sation could develop.10 On Progovac’s account, small clause grammars like the one
exemplified in [1] served as a foundation for the emergence of verb and tensed phras-
es—permitting both clear distinctions between the subjects and objects of a verb (as in
[2], [3] and [4]) and the introduction of tense markers for reporting the temporal struc-
9 I am sympathetic to two further claims about such utterances, although I won’t defend them here. First,
Progovac’s proto-syntax may capture the utterances produced by enculturated chimpanzees and bonobos
(Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998; Rivas 2005). Second, this proto-syntax may resemble pre-verbal thought
in both human and other great ape species.
10 Somemay regard the transitions from [1] to [2]–[5] as transitions fromnon-propositional to propositional
content. I do not. On the measurement theoretic account of propositions I prefer (Matthews 2011), there is
no hard distinction between propositional and non-propositional contents.
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ture of an agent’s actions ([4] and [5]).11 With the development of sentential structures
that facilitated the unambiguous expression of relatively complex propositions, a new
platform would emerge against which attitude expressions could be developed.
5.3 From propositions to propositional attitude psychology
If explicit ToM is grounded in the ability to model propositional attitudes in language
then it is also necessary to say something about the origin of propositional attitude
reports. Evidence from comparative linguistics supports the hypothesis that the first
propositional attitude verbs described perceptual relationships that could be tracked
using non-verbal perceptual mechanisms—e.g.:
Kofi saw that the food is there.
There are several reasons for thinking that such reports were the foundation for more
abstract epistemic state reports. First, since perceptual states can reliably be tracked
using only behavioural cues—e.g., whether or not something has crossed an agent’s
line of sight (Butterfill & Apperly 2013)—perceptual state descriptions could emerge
in the absence of a developed ToM. The underlying mechanisms could be explained
in terms of general-purpose learning (Heyes 2018) or a phylogenetically old cognitive
mechanism for tracking agents’ object registrations (Apperly andButterfill 2009). Sec-
ond,more abstract epistemic states, i.e. those that co-vary less reliablywith behavioural
cues, can be conceived of as superordinate categories for combining elements of per-
ceptual deliverances. For example, knowledge might initially have been construed as
an epistemic state that combined the deliverances of the senses without specifying
the modality by which some proposition was known. Third, in many languages, verbs
related to knowledge are etymologically derived fromperception verbs. Based on com-
parative studies of language, Sweetser (1990) held that the extension of perception
verbs to cognition verbs was likely a feature of all languages:
The objective, intellectual side of our mental life seems to be mainly linked with
the sense of vision, although other senses … occasionally take on intellectual
meanings as well. There are major similarities in our general linguistic treatment
of vision and intellection. (ibid., p.37)
Sweetser shows that knowledge terms in Indo-European languages originated from
the metaphorical extension of verbs related to seeing (ibid.). Nonetheless, contrary
to her prediction, the foundational status of vision with respect to knowledge talk is
not universal. In aboriginal languages like Dalabon verbs related to knowledge and
thinking derive from hearing verbs. In one language, Warluwarra, a single verb –rlari
means both ‘to hear’ and ‘to think’ (Evans and Wilkins 2000). While the Australian
languages falsify Sweetser’s prediction, they are consistent with the weaker but related
hypothesis that verbs related to knowing derive from perception terms.
11 Progovac (2015) also argues the ability to combine constructions hierarchically required natural selection
for language-specific syntax. Thismay be but her view of the stages of syntax development is consistent with
alternative accounts. For example, syntactic complexity in natural languages might have emerged under
selection pressure for general-purpose cognitive abilities [e.g., sequence learning (Chater and Christiansen
2016)] and the cultural evolution of natural language grammars.
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While perceptual state reports are one possible source of epistemic state verbs (and
their accompanying concepts), they are not the only one. Mental state terms related to
knowing and believing can also derive from direct speech reports (Jary 2010; Geurts
in press, Mind and Language). Very often people’s beliefs can be inferred from what
they say. Thus we can imagine a metaphorical extension of the use of speech report
terms like ‘said that p’ to cover cases in which a speaker had not said that p, but where
commitment to the truth of p could be inferred from her actions. Such constructions are
used in another Aboriginal language, Ungarinyin, spoken in North-Western Australia.
In that language the sentence “gunin nya-nga-yi-minda a-ma jirri” can be translated
both as He says: ‘I will cover her’, and He thinks: ‘I will cover her’ (Geurts in press,
Mind and Language; via Spronck 2016, p. 259).12
These potential roots for the development ofmental state talk are not in competition.
It may be that knowledge talk in all languages has derived from perception talk,
and belief talk always from speech talk, but there could also be cultural variation in
these patterns. Future empirical research may provide us with clear answers. In the
meantime I propose a number of conclusions. (1) There are multiple possible routes
to the development of the mental state verbs via the metaphorical extension of verbs
used for reporting perception and speech. (2) These cases show that epistemic terms
can be conceived of as abstractions from verbs grounded in descriptions correlated
with behaviour—without presupposing a developed understanding of mental states.
(3) In light of the potential for variation in the construction of mental state verbs,
there is reason to expect empirical variation in how different groups of language users
think and talk about minds. Each of these claims is consistent with the claim that our
uniquely human propositional attitude psychology is enabled by the cultural evolution
of models of human psychology formulated in natural language.
5.4 Non-Gricean accounts of language development
Before concluding, more must be said about the developmental relationship between
ToM and language. Some sympathetic to language-first accounts of ToM now argue
that natural language development can be explained without assuming that pre-verbal
speakers can act with and attribute communicative intent (Gauker 2002; Jary 2010;
Bar-On 2013; Millikan 2017; Geurts 2019a, b; for influential older works see also
Sellars 1956; Dennett 1996).
To illustrate with one example, Geurts (2019) has argued that we can think of the
contents of utterances not as ToM-involving expressions of communicative intent, but
as overt normative commitments to certain courses of action.13 Since these give rise
to publicly observable behavioural outcomes they can be grasped without the need for
inferences about speakers’ mental states. Since any successful account of language
development must be consistent with explanations of both how infants come to grasp
12 The example I use here is adapted from Spronck’s original. Thanks to Alan Rumsey (private correspon-
dence) for the verb substitution he suggested..
13 For discussion of Dennett’s account of infant language acquisition see Moore (2010). Discussion of
Bar-On’s view can be found in Moore (2018b)—although Bar-On has since incorporated the notion of
‘expression pragmatics’ into her view (Arnold & Bar-On 2020)..
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the contents of others’ utterances, and of how our ancestors could develop the earliest
natural languages, this raises the question of how creatures lacking an adult-like ToM
could know which commitment a speaker has made—i.e. how non-verbal creatures
grasp the contents of others’ utterances. Geurts argues that where a speaker’s words are
ambiguous, which commitment a speaker has undertaken can be inferred from factors
that are independent of the speaker’s mental states. These include considerations of the
coherence of rival interpretations (Geurts 2019b), and statistical correlations between
utterances and behavioural outcomes (Geurts 2019a). As a result, he argues, there is
“no reason to suppose that mindreading is the driving force of pragmatics” (Geurts
2019b, p. 6).
While I agree with Geurts that appeals to statistical correlations play an important
role in language development, and that developed ToM will not, I doubt that the
range of children’s utterance interpretation will be explicable without appeal to an
understanding of communicative goals. For infants who lack knowledge of a language,
considerations of sentential coherence (e.g., of which words frequently co-occur) can
play only a minor role in early utterance comprehension. Nonetheless, young children
succeed in learning the meanings of words even where they hear the name of a new
object only once (making statistical explanations unlikely), and where they do not see
the object at the time they hear it named (suggesting that they are not relying only on
crude behavioural cues). In a study by Akhtar and Tomasello (1996), an experimenter
told 24-month-olds “Let’s find the gazzer”, before trying and failing to open the door
of the barn in which the toy was hidden. Unable to find the toy, the experimenter turned
her attention to other things. Nonetheless children later demonstrated that they had
learned the gazzer’s name. Seemingly they inferred the speaker’s referential intention
in light of an understanding of her ongoing goal-directed activity.
Cases like this remind us that central to our understanding of communicative
behaviour is a more general understanding of goal-directed behaviour. This enables
us to interpret ambiguous utterances in light of a prior grasp of what agents are try-
ing to achieve. It is this that provides us with much of the sense of coherence that
drives utterance interpretation—reminding us that communicative intentions are just
a subset of agents’ purposive activity. From this it follows that the best way to make
sense of language development will not be to give up on the idea that communica-
tive intentions are foundational, but to develop a more nuanced understanding of the
varieties of purposive activity that are at work in ascriptions of communicative intent,
and particularly the pragmatic inferences central to language development. Statistical
learning will be important here, but statistical inferences will be best understood as
part of the evidence that children use to make sense of others’ goal directed behaviour,
including their goal directed communicative behaviour.
6 Closing remarks
In this paper I have sketched a framework for making sense of the possibility that
human ToM emerged on the back of communal language development. I hope also to
have shown how new avenues of researchmight provide further empirical evidence for
the hypothesis presented here. The developmental dependence of higher-order min-
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dreading on language would be illustrated if the relevant ToM abilities are correlated
with the mastery of higher order sentential complements and also impaired by tasks
that interferewith language cognition (e.g., Newton andDeVilliers 2007). If language-
based tasks interfere with level-2 perspective taking, this would also be evidence that
we use language to construct representations of how things look to others.
The account developed here predicts that there may be undiscovered variation in
how historical communities have thought about minds—and in whether they thought
about mental states at all. While there is evidence of cultural variation in ToM reason-
ing, we know relatively little about these differences and even less about how mental
states have been conceived historically, and whether cultural differences in mental
state talk correlate with differences in ToM. This is something that will be under-
stood only with more systematic empirical research. This could be pursued through
comparative linguistic analyses of mental state talk across cultures. If it turned out
that some natural languages—including historical languages—lack some or all terms
for mental states, this would be evidence for the cultural evolution hypothesis. The
evidence would be even stronger if speakers of these languages turned out to perform
poorly on language-correlated ToM tasks.
If this evidence is forthcoming, a new project will await us: reconsidering the
behaviours of ancestral humans in light of the possibility that they lacked the ToM
that we now posses. It will then fall to us to work out when and where in human history
uniquely human forms of ToM arose.
Acknowledgements For discussion and written feedback on various incarnations of this paper I would
like to thank Dorit Bar-On, Rachael Brown, Steve Butterfill, Nick Evans, Bart Geurts, Celia Heyes, John
Michael, RonPlaner, PaulaRubio Fernandez,AlanRumsey,KimSterelny, TadZawidzki, and an anonymous
reviewer for Synthese. Additional thanks are owed to the Department of Philosophy at the Australian
National University. The talk on which this paper was based was written while I was an RSSS Fellow there
in March and April of 2018 and was presented at the ANU’s 2018 Interdisciplinary Workshop on Social
Cognition. The paper was the developed in a subsequent trip in August 2019, and presented at the ANU’s
2019 workshop on Kinds of Intelligences. This work was supported by an ANU RSSS Visiting Fellowship
awarded to RichardMoore in 2018, and by the UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship awarded in 2020 to support
Moore’s project on The Communicative Mind.
OpenAccess This article is licensedunder aCreativeCommonsAttribution 4.0 InternationalLicense,which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence,
and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included
in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If
material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted
by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the
copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Adrian, J., Clemente, R., Villanueva, L., & Rieffe, C. (2005). Parent–child picture-book reading, mothers’
mental state language and children’s theory of mind. Journal of Child Language, 32(03), 673–686.
Akhtar, N., & Tomasello, M. (1996). Two-year-olds learn words for absent objects and actions. British
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 14(1), 79–93.
Apperly, I. (2010). Mindreaders: The cognitive basis of “theory of mind”. Hove: Psychology Press.
123
Synthese
Apperly, I., & Butterfill, S. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?
Psychological Review, 116(4), 953.
Apperly, I., Samson,D., Carroll, N.,Hussain, S.,&Humphreys,G. (2006). Intact first-and second-order false
belief reasoning in a patient with severely impaired grammar. Social Neuroscience, 1(3–4), 334–348.
Arnold, K., & Bar-On, D. (2020). Primate pragmatics, expressive behavior, and the evolution of language.
Animal Behavior and Cognition, 7(2), 117–130.
Astington, J. (2006). The developmental interdependence of theory of mind and language. In N. J. Enfield
& S. C. Levinson (Eds.), Roots of Human Sociality (pp. 179–206). New York: Berg.
Bar-On, D. (2013). Origins of meaning: Must we ‘go Gricean’? Mind and Language, 28(3), 342–375.
Bar-On, D., & Moore, R. (2017). Pragmatics and the signaller-receiver asymmetry in language evolu-
tion research. In K. Andrews & J. Beck (Eds.), Routledge handbook of philosophy of animal minds
(pp. 291–300). Milton Park: Taylor & Francis.
Bennett, J. (1978). Some remarks about concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(04), 557–560.
Berio, L. (2020). Culturally embedded schemata for false belief reasoning. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.10
07/s11229-020-02655-7.
Berwick, R., & Chomsky, N. (2016). Why only us: Language and evolution. Cambridge: MIT press.
Brannon,E.M.,&Terrace,H. S. (1998).Ordering of the numerosities 1 to 9 bymonkeys.Science, 282(5389),
746–749.
Breheny, R. (2006). Communication and folk psychology. Mind and Language, 21(1), 74–107.
Butterfill, S. A., & Apperly, I. A. (2013). How to construct a minimal theory of mind. Mind & Language,
28(5), 606–637.
Carruthers, P. (2013). Mindreading in infancy. Mind and Language, 28(2), 141–172.
Christiansen, M. H., & Chater, N. (2016). Creating language: Integrating evolution, acquisition, and pro-
cessing. MIT Press.
Crockford, C., Wittig, R., Mundry, R., & Zuberbühler, K. (2012). Wild chimpanzees inform ignorant group
members of danger. Current Biology, 22(2), 142–146.
Crockford, C., Wittig, R. M., & Zuberbühler, K. (2017). Vocalizing in chimpanzees is influenced by social-
cognitive processes. Science Advances, 3(11), e1701742.
de Villiers, J. (2005). Can language acquisition give children a point of view? In J. W. Astington & J. A.
Baird (Eds.), Why language matters for theory of mind. Oxford: OUP.
de Villiers, J., & de Villiers, P. (2000). Linguistic determinism and the understanding of false belief. In P.
Mitchell & K. J. Riggs (Eds.), Children’s reasoning and the mind (pp. 191–228). Hove: Psychology
Press.
de Villiers, J., & Pyers, J. (2002). Complements to cognition: A longitudinal study of the relationship
between complex syntax and false-belief-understanding. Cognitive Development, 17(1), 1037–1060.
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 568–570.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge: MIT press.
Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Dennett, D. (1996). Kinds of minds. New York: Basic Books.
Dungan, J., & Saxe, R. (2012). Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference.
Cognitive Science, 36(6), 1148–1156.
Eickers, G. (2019). Scripted alignment: A theory of social interaction. Ph.D. Dissertation, FU Berlin.
Evans,N.,&Wilkins,D. (2000). In themind’s ear: The semantic extensions of perception verbs inAustralian
languages. Language, 76, 546–592.
Everett, C. (2017). Numbers and the making of us: Counting and the course of human cultures. Cambridge:
Harvard UP.
Feigenson, L., & Carey, S. (2003). Tracking individuals via object-files: Evidence from infants’ manual
search. Developmental Science, 6(5), 568–584.
Flavell, J., Everett, B., Croft, K., & Flavell, E. (1981). Young children’s knowledge about visual perception:
Further evidence for the Level 1–Level 2 distinction. Developmental Psychology, 17, 99–103.
Fodor, J. A. (2008). LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford: OUP.
Frank, M. C., Everett, D. L., Fedorenko, E., & Gibson, E. (2008). Number as a cognitive technology:
Evidence from Pirahã language and cognition. Cognition, 108(3), 819–824.
Garfield, J. L., Peterson, C. C., & Perry, T. (2001). Social cognition, language acquisition and the develop-
ment of the theory of mind. Mind and Language, 16(5), 494–541.
Gauker, C. (2002). Words without meaning. MIT Press.
123
Synthese
Geurts, B. (2019a). Communication as commitment sharing: Speech acts, implicatures, common ground.
Theoretical Linguistics, 45(1–2), 1–30.
Geurts, B. (2019b). What’s wrong with Gricean pragmatics. In A. Botinis (ed.) ExLing 2019: Proceedings
of the 10th international conference of Experimental Linguistics (pp. 1–9).
Geurts, B. (in press). First saying, then believing: The pragmatic roots of folk psychology.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2005). Folk psychology as a model. Philosophers’ Imprint, 5(6), 1–16.
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading.
Oxford: OUP.
Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A., & Bryant, P. (1997). Words, thoughts, and theories. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Grice, P. (1957). Meaning. The Philosophical Review, 66, s377–s388.
Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. (2017a). Implicit and explicit false belief
development in preschool children. Developmental Science, 20(5), e12445.
Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. (2020). Two systems for thinking about
others’ thoughts in the developing brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(12),
6928–6935.
Grosse Wiesmann, C., Schreiber, J., Singer, T., Steinbeis, N., & Friederici, A. D. (2017b). White matter
maturation is associated with the emergence of theory of mind in early childhood. Nature Communi-
cations, 8, 14692.
Grueneisen, S., Wyman, E., & Tomasello, M. (2015). “I know you don’t know I know…” Children use
second-order false-belief reasoning for peer coordination. Child Development, 86(1), 287–293.
Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal
Behaviour, 61(1), 139–151.
Harris, P., de Rosnay, M., & Pons, F. (2005). Language and children’s understanding of mental states.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(2), 69–73.
Hauser, M. D., & Carey, S. (2003). Spontaneous representations of small numbers of objects by rhesus
macaques: Examinations of content and format. Cognitive Psychology, 47(4), 367–401.
Helming, K., Strickland, B., & Jacob, P. (2014). Making sense of early false-belief understanding. Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, 18(4), 167–170.
Helming, K., Strickland, B., & Jacob, P. (2016). Solving the puzzle about early belief-ascription. Mind and
Language, 31(4), 438–469.
Heyes, C. (2018). Cognitive gadgets: The cultural evolution of thinking. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Heyes, C. M., & Frith, C. D. (2014). The cultural evolution of mind reading. Science, 344(6190), 1243091.
Hurley, S. L. (1998). Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure, and externalism. Analysis, 58(1), 1–6.
Hutto, D. D. (2004). The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind and Language, 19(5), 548–573.
Hutto, D. (2007). Folk psychological narratives: The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. MIT
press.
Jara-Ettinger, J. (2019). Theory of mind as inverse reinforcement learning. Current Opinion in Behavioral
Sciences, 29, 105–110.
Jary, M. (2010). Assertion and false-belief attribution. Pragmatics & Cognition, 18(1), 17–39.
Kaplan, R. (1999). The nothing that is: A natural history of zero. Oxford: OUP.
Karg, K., Schmelz, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Differing views: Can chimpanzees do level 2
perspective-taking? Animal Cognition, 19(3), 555–564.
Krupenye, C., Kano, F., Hirata, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Great apes anticipate that other
individuals will act according to false beliefs. Science, 354(6308), 110–114.
Liddle, B., & Nettle, D. (2006). Higher-order theory of mind and social competence in school-age children.
Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology, 4(3–4), 231–244.
Lillard, A. (1998). Ethnopsychologies: cultural variations in theories of mind. Psychological Bulletin,
123(1), 3.
Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Striano, T., & Tomasello, M. (2006). 12-and 18-month-olds point to provide
information for others. Journal of Cognition and Development, 7(2), 173–187.
Lohmann, H., & Tomasello, M. (2003). The role of language in the development of false belief understand-
ing: A training study. Child Development, 74(4), 1130–1144.
Low, J. (2010). Preschoolers’ implicit and explicit false-belief understanding: Relations with complex
syntactical mastery. Child Development, 81(2), 597–615.
123
Synthese
Low, J., Apperly, I. A., Butterfill, S. A., & Rakoczy, H. (2016). Cognitive architecture of belief reasoning
in children and adults: A primer on the two-systems account. Child Development Perspectives, 10(3),
184–189.
Lutz, C. (1985). Ethnopsychology compared to what? Explaining behavior and consciousness among the
Ifaluk. In G. M. White & J. Kirkpatrick (Eds.), Person, self and experience (pp. 35–79). Cambridge:
CUP.
Maibom, H. (2003). The mindreader and the scientist. Mind and Language, 18(3), 296–315.
Matthews, R. (2011). Measurement-theoretic accounts of propositional attitudes. Philosophy Compass,
6(11), 828–841.
Mayer, A., & Träuble, B. E. (2013). Synchrony in the onset of mental state understanding across cultures?
A study among children in Samoa. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 37(1), 21–28.
McGeer, V. (2007). The regulative dimension of folk psychology. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), Folk
psychology reassessed. Dordrecht: Springer.
Milligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007). Language and theory of mind: Meta-analysis of the
relation between language ability and false-belief understanding. Child Development, 78(2), 622–646.
Millikan, R. (2017). Beyond concepts: Unicepts, language, and natural information. Oxford University
Press.
Moll, H., & Meltzoff, A. (2011). How does it look? Level 2 perspective-taking at 36 months of age. Child
Development, 82(2), 661–673.
Moll, H., Meltzoff, A., Merzsch, K., & Tomasello, M. (2013). Taking versus confronting visual perspectives
in preschool children. Developmental Psychology, 49(4), 646.
Moore, R. (2010). Learning to do things with words. Ph.D. thesis, University of Warwick.
Moore, R. (2013). Imitation and conventional communication. Biology & Philosophy, 28(3), 481–500.
Moore, R. (2016). Meaning and ostension in great ape gestural communication. Animal Cognition, 19(1),
223–231.
Moore, R. (2017a). Gricean communication and cognitive development. Philosophical Quarterly, 67(267),
303–326.
Moore, R. (2017b). Convergent minds: Ostension, inference and Grice’s third clause. Interface Focus, 7,
20160107.
Moore, R. (2017c). Social cognition, stag hunts, and the evolution of language. Biology and Philosophy,
32(6), 797–818.
Moore, R. (2017d). Pragmatics-first approaches to the evolution of language. Psychological Inquiry,
28(2–3), 206–210.
Moore, R. (2018a). Gricean communication, joint action, and the evolution of cooperation. Topoi, 37(2),
329–341.
Moore, R. (2018b). Gricean communication, language development, and animal minds. Philosophy Com-
pass, 13(12), e12550.
Moore, R. (2019). Utterances without force. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 96(3), 342–358.
Newton, A. M., & de Villiers, J. G. (2007). Thinking while talking: Adults fail nonverbal false-belief
reasoning. Psychological Science, 18(7), 574–579.
O’Grady, C., Kliesch, C., Smith, K., & Scott-Phillips, T. C. (2015). The ease and extent of recursive
mindreading, across implicit and explicit tasks. Evolution and Human Behavior, 36(4), 313–322.
O’Madagain,C.,&Tomasello,M. (2019). Joint attention tomental content and the social origin of reasoning.
Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02327-1.
Ochs, E. (1988). Culture and language development: Language acquisition and language socialization in
a Samoan village. Cambridge: CUP.
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308,
255–258.
Perner, J., Sprung, M., Zauner, P., & Haider, H. (2003). Want that is understood well before say that, think
that, and false belief: A test of de Villiers’s linguistic determinism on German–speaking children.
Child Development, 74(1), 179–188.
Perner, J., & Wimmer, H. (1985). “John thinks that Mary thinks that…” attribution of second-order beliefs
by 5-to 10-year-old children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 39(3), 437–471.




Poulin-Dubois, D., Rakoczy, H., Burnside, K., Crivello, C., Dörrenberg, S., & Edwards, K., et al. (2018).
Do infants understand false beliefs? We don’t know yet–A commentary on Baillargeon, Buttelmann
and Southgate’s commentary. Cognitive Development, 48, 302–315.
Progovac, L. (2015). Evolutionary syntax. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Pyers, J. E. (2006). Constructing the social mind: language and false-belief understanding. In N. J. Enfield
& S. C. Levinson (Eds.), Roots of Human Sociality (pp. 207–228). New York: Berg.
Pyers, J. E., & Senghas, A. (2009). Language promotes false-belief understanding evidence from learners
of a new sign language. Psychological Science, 20(7), 805–812.
Rakoczy, H. (2017). In defense of a developmental dogma: Children acquire propositional attitude folk
psychology around age 4. Synthese, 194(3), 689–707.
Rakoczy, H., & Behne, T. (2019). Commitment sharing as crucial step toward a developmentally plausible
speech act theory? Theoretical Linguistics, 45(1–2), 93–97.
Rivas, E. (2005). Recent use of signs by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in interactions with humans. Journal
of Comparative Psychology, 119(4), 404.
Rubio-Fernandez, P. (2020). Pragmatic markers: The missing link between language and theory of mind.
Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02768-z.
Rubio-Fernández, P. & Geurts, B. (2012). How to pass the false-belief task before your fourth birthday.
Psychological Science, 0956797612447819.
Rubio-Fernández, P., & Geurts, B. (2016). Don’t mention the marble! The role of attentional processes in
false-belief tasks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(4), 835–850.
Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002). The relation between children’s and mothers’ mental state
language and theory-of-mind understanding. Child Development, 73(3), 734–751.
Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Shanker, S., & Taylor, T. (1998). Apes, language, and the human mind. Oxford:
OUP.
Scott-Phillips, T. (2014). Speaking our minds: Why human communication is different, and how language
evolved to make It special. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Sellars,W. (1956). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
1(19), 253–329.
Sober, E. (2005). Comparative psychology meets evolutionary biology: Morgan’s Canon and cladistic
parsimony. In L. Daston & G. Mitman (Eds.), Thinking with animals: New perspectives on anthropo-
morphism (pp. 85–99). New York: Columbia UP.
Sperber, D. (2000). Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective. In D. Sperber (Ed.), Metarepresen-
tations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (pp. 117–137). Oxford: OUP.
Sperber, D., &Wilson, D. (2002). Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading. Mind and Language, 17(1–2),
3–23.
Spronck, S. (2016). Evidential fictive interaction (in Ungarinyin and Russian). In E. Pascual & S. Sandler
(Eds.), The conversation frame: Forms and functions of fictive interaction (pp. 255–275). Amsterdam:
John Benjamins.
Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological
Science, 18(7), 580–586.
Sweetser, E. (1990). From etymology to pragmatics: Metaphorical and cultural aspects of semantic struc-
ture. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of human communication. Cambridge: MIT.
Tomasello, M. (2014). A natural history of human thinking. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Tomasello, M. (2018). How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(34), 8491–8498.
Tomasello, M. (2019). Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
Toon, A. (2016). Fictionalism and the folk. The Monist, 99(3), 280–295.
Van Cleave, M., & Gauker, C. (2010). Linguistic practice and false-belief tasks. Mind and Language, 25(3),
298–328.
Westra, E. (2017). Pragmatic development and the false belief task. Review of Philosophy and Psychology,
8(2), 235–257.
Wierzbicka, A. (1992). Semantics, culture, and cognition: Universal human concepts in culture-specific
configurations. Oxford: OUP.
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong
beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103–128.
123
Synthese
Xu, F. (2003).Numerosity discrimination in infants: Evidence for two systems of representations.Cognition,
89(1), B15–B25.
Zawidzki, T. (2019). A new perspective on the relationship between metacognition and social cognition:
Metacognitive concepts as socio-cognitive tools. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-0247
7-2.
Zawidzki, T. W. (2013). Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
123
